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BACK TO THE FUTURE: UNITED STATES V. JONES
RESUSCITATES PROPERTY LAW CONCEPTS IN
FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Nancy Forster
Calling the Fourth Amendment "an embarrassment," noted
scholar Akhil Reed Amar had this to say about United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law:
Much of what the Supreme Court has said in the last
half century-that the Amendment generally calls for
warrants and probable cause for all searches and
seIzures, and exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence-is initially plausible but ultimately
misguided. As a matter of text, history, and plain old
common sense, these three pillars of modem Fourth
Amendment case law are hard to support; in fact,
today's Supreme Court does not really support them.
Except when it does. Warrants are not requiredunless they are. All searches and seizures must be
grounded in probable cause-but not on Tuesdays.
And unlawfully seized evidence must be excluded
whenever five votes say so. . .. The result is a vast
jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely
complex and contradictory, but often perverse .... '
What is most interesting about this acerbic summation of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that it was written in 1994;
almost twenty years and 130 Fourth Amendment Supreme Court
opinions ago. 2 If Professor Amar was embarrassed by Supreme
1.

2.

Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757,
757-58 (1994) (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012)
(holding that invasive searches conducted by county jails did not violate
detainee's Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (holding that Government's attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle,
and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (holding that a strip search of a student based on
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Court opinions on the subject in 1994, he must certainly be
apoplectic today in light of the Court's recent decision in United
States v. Jones. 3 Writing for the Court in Jones, Justice Scalia
resuscitated property law concepts to define a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, insisting the concepts
had never died. 4 This insistence will no doubt come as a
surprise to many in the legal community, including fellow
Supreme Court justices, who thought the use of property law,
and more specifically the doctrine of trespass, in the Fourth
Amendment context had been overruled by the Court in Katz v.
United States. 5 A litigant's reliance on a trespass theory postKatz was routinely tossed aside as no longer viable. 6 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently summed it up best:

3.
4.

5.

6.

principal's suspicion that student was distributing drugs violated the Fourth
Amendment); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 364 (2009) (holding that
suspicionless search of California parolee did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (holding that
warrantless search of probationer's home was authorized by a condition of his
parole was reasonable as required by the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that warrantless use of thennal imaging
device to measure heat emanating from home violated the Fourth Amendment);
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (holding that Fourth Amendment
permitted warrantless seizure of vehicle from public space with probable cause
to believe it was forfeitable contraband); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65
(1998) (holding that officers executing search warrant did not violate Fourth
Amendment when they broke garage window during court of "no-knock" entry
into Defendant's residence); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding
that Fourth Amendment does not require that detainee be "free to go" before
his consent to search will be deemed voluntary).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
Id. at 950 ("At bottom, we must 'assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.'
As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (,persons,
houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates.") (citation omitted).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ('''We conclude that the
underpinnings of Olmstead [v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, (1928)] and
Goldman [v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, (1942)] have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer
be regarded as controlling. "'); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138
(1984) ("[P]recedents such as Katz v. United States . .. overrul[e] the 'trespass'
doctrine."); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 269 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting) (stating Katz "administered the formal coup de grace to the
moribund doctrine of Olmstead').
See, e.g., Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 2009)
("[A]lthough the Supreme Court has often expressed concern for protecting
'the sanctity of a man's home,' it has, with equal vigor, emphasized that 'the
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The Jones decision represents a significant change in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence unanticipated by any
of the circuit courts which had faced the question of
whether use of a GPS unit amounted to a Fourth
Amendment search. Courts and commentators had
understood that in [Katz]... "the Supreme Court
replaced the trespass doctrine with the pnvacy
doctrine.,,7

7.

Fourth Amendment protects people, not places .... ' Thus, the Supreme Court
long ago abandoned the 'trespass' doctrine .... ") (citations omitted); United
States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Although originally
viewed as protecting property rights of individuals, the Supreme Court has now
rejected the idea that fourth amendment coverage turns on 'arcane distinctions
developed in property ... law."') (citation omitted); United States v. Jackson,
588 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In finding an illegal search despite the
absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth, the Court rejected the
trespass doctrine applied in previous cases and held that an individual is
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection whenever he has a 'reasonable
expectation of privacy. "'); United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th
Cir. 1977) ("We recognize that the Supreme Court in [Katz] stated that the
underpinnings of Goldman and Olmstead had been so eroded that the 'trespass'
doctrine could no longer be deemed as controlling.") (citation omitted); Dancy
v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that the cases
delineating the trespass theory "were expressly overruled" by Katz); United
States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1298 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Overruling the
'trespass' doctrine announced in [Olmstead], and [Goldman], the Court
observed that Katz sought to exclude the 'uninvited ear' and noted that 'the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."') (citations omitted); United
States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 1968) ("The trespass and
physical intrusion doctrines were rejected in Katz. ").
United States v. Fisher, Nos. 2:1O-cr-28, 2:IO-cr-32, 2012 WL 6913429, at *9
(W.D. Mich. 2012) (citation omitted). The federal District Court in Hawaii
similarly interpreted the lower courts' understanding of Katz in United States v.
Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (D. Haw. 2012), where it noted:
That Jones now makes clear that the Fourth Amendment
reasonable expectation of privacy test augments, but does
not displace, concepts of trespass does not directly address
the law as understood in 2009. In fact, [United States v.]
McIver [186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999)], in the context of
the placement of the GPS device, drew a clear distinction
between trespass law and a Fourth Amendment reasonable
expectation of privacy: "Assuming arguendo that the
officers committed a trespass in walking into McIver's open
driveway, he has failed to demonstrate that he had a
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Part I of this article will trace the early use of property law in
Fourth Amendment cases involving surreptitiously gathered
information. Part II will examine Katz and post-Katz cases that
changed the focus in defining a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment from property rights to privacy rights. Part
III of the article will analyze the Jones case with particular
emphasis on its revival of and reliance on the trespass doctrine
instead of the privacy emphasis created in Katz and what it may
portend.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE: THE

TRESPASS THEORY
One of the earliest cases to interpret the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is Boyd
v. United States. 8 Boyd was accused of fraud for failing to pay
required duties on thirty-five cases of imported plate glass, and
the government, over Boyd's objection, sought forfeiture of the
goods. 9 During the forfeiture proceeding, it became necessary
for the government to prove the quantity and value of the glass,
and in order to do so, the government introduced invoices. 10
Those invoices had been obtained by the government pursuant
to an order of the district court directing Boyd to produce
them. II Boyd challenged the constitutionality of the statute
permitting a court to order production of documents claiming it
violated the Fourth Amendment. 12 The issue before the U.S.
Supreme Court devolved to:
[Whether] a search and seizure, or, what is equivalent
thereto, a compulsory production of a man's private
papers, to be used in evidence against him in a
proceeding to forfeit his property for alleged fraud
against the revenue laws-is such a proceeding for
such a purpose an 'unreasonable search and seizure'

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

legitimate expectation of privacy cognizable under the
Fourth Amendment in this portion of his property.
Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (quoting United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d
1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Id. at 617-18.
Id.at618.
Id.
Id.
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within the meaning of the fourth amendment of the
constitution [.] 13
Hearkening back to British use of writs of assistance and
general warrants against the colonists,14 the Court explained the
practices that animated the Fourth Amendment.
The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing
writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering
them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for
smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced 'the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book;' since they placed 'the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer.' This was in February,
1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it
occurred was perhaps the most prominent event which
inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the
oppressions of the mother country. . .. These things,
and the events which took place in England
immediately following the argument about writs of
assistance in Boston, were fresh in the memories of
those who achieved our independence and established
our form of govemment. 15
But it was the decision written by Lord Camden in Entick v.
Carrington l6-condemning the entry of the private home of
John Wilkes under the authority of a general warrant issued by
the secretary of state for the search and seizure of papers that
would support a claim of libel-that the Boyd Court found most
persuasive on the subject.
The great end for which men entered into society was
to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred
13.
14.

15.
16.

Id. at 622.
The act that pennitted the issuance of writs of assistance, 13 & 14 Car. II. C.
11, § 5, authorized the search "of ships and vessels, and persons found therein,
for the purpose of finding goods ... on which the duties were not paid." Boyd,
116 U.S. at 626-27. General warrants "authorized searches in any place, for
any thing." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 641.
Id.at625.
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tri. 1030 (1765).
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and incommunicable in all instances where it has not
been taken away or abridged by some public law for
the good of the whole. The cases where this right of
property is set aside by positive law are various.
Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, etc., are all of
this description, wherein every man by common
consent gives up that right for the sake of justice and
the general good. By the laws of England, every
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground
without my license, but he is liable to an action, though
the damage be nothing, which is proved by every
declaration in trespass where the defendant is called
upon to answer for bruising the grass and even
treading upon the soil. I?
Thus, the Court held that while there was no literal trespass
onto Boyd's property by the government, "any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man's ... private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his goods, is
within the condemnation of [Entick].,,18 Further, the Court
pointed out that the words of Lord Camden in Entick were
"relied on as expressing the true doctrine on the subject of
searches and seizures, and ... furnish[ ed] the true criteria of the
reasonable and 'unreasonable' character of ... [searches and]
seizures" referred to in the Fourth Amendment. 19
Boyd was followed by Weeks v. United States. 20 Weeks was
charged with using the mails to engage in a lottery enterprise. 21
After arresting Weeks, state police and federal agents, without a
search warrant, obtained the key to Weeks's home, entered it,
searched it, and seized numerous papers and documents found
inside. 22 Those documents were the subject of a motion filed by
Weeks for their return. 23 The trial court ruled that those seized
documents not relevant to the trial had to be returned but those

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-27 (emphasis added).
Id. at 630.
Id.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 387-89.
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needed for trial could be introduced. 24 Finding that the
appropriate remedy for violating the Fourth Amendment was
exclusion of the seized evidence from use at trial, the Court
elaborated on the illegal nature of the search and seizure
conducted in the case:
Resistance to [unreasonable searches and seizures] had
established the principle which was enacted into the
fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a
man's house was his castle and not to be invaded by
any general authority to search and seize his goods and
papers .... "The maxim that 'every man's house is his
castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in the
clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,
and has always been looked upon as of high value to
the citizen." "Accordingly ... no man's house can be
forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away
after it has thus been forced, except in cases of felony;
and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant,
and take great care lest he commit a trespass. This
principle is jealously insisted upon.,,25
The Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the
government noting that in Weeks's case, police had engaged "in
the wrongful invasion of the home of [a] citizen and the
unwarranted seizure of his papers and property. ,,26
The same property principles were applied to the defendant's
place of business in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States /7
where federal agents, without a warrant, entered the defendant's
company and "made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and
documents found there.,,28 The Court applied the Weeks
decision and concluded that "knowledge gained by the
Government's own wrong cannot be used by it .... ,,29
The Supreme Court consistently interpreted a Fourth
Amendment search in terms of property law principles and
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 388. It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court ruled that the
exclusionary rule would apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389, 390.
Id. at 394-98.
Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Id. at 390.
/d. at 391-92.
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looked to the conduct of the government to detennine whether
or not a trespass had been committed. 30 But the cases before the
Court were rather simplistic and clear CUt. 31 They generally
involved government agents breaking into a defendant's home
or office, searching it, and seizing items of evidence, all without
a warrant. 32 The cases required very little in the way of analysis
by the Court as the wording of the Fourth Amendment clearly
prohibited such conduct. 33 But advancing technology soon
permitted police to obtain evidence without breaking into the
home of defendants. Thus, in 1928 the Court was confronted
with a case involving evidence of private telephone
conversations obtained by police, without a warrant, through the
use of wiretapping. In Olmstead v. United States, the defendant
was suspected of violating the National Prohibition Act. 34
Police gathered evidence over a period of months by inserting
small wires "along the ordinary telephone wires from the
residences of four of the [defendants] and those leading from the
chief office. The insertions were made without trespass upon
any property of the defendants. They were made in the
basement of the large office building. The taps from house lines
30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) ("[I]t has always been
assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant.
. .. The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable
and abhorrent to our laws."); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)
("[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields.
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law.");
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314-17 (1921) (stating that evidence
"seized in the search of [Amos's] home by government agents without warrant
of any kind, in plain violation of the Fourth . . . Amendment[]" must be
suppressed).
See Agnello, 269 U.S. at 29-30; Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16; Silverthorne
Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 390; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386
(1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See Agnello, 269 U.S. at 29-30; Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16; Silverthorne
Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 390; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386, overruled by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30; Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16; Silverthorne Lumber
Co., 251 U.S. at 391-92; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. The Fourth Amendment
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (\928), overruled in part by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (\967).
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were made in the streets near the houses.,,35
Olmstead
challenged the admissibility of the evidence arguing the
wiretapping was an unconstitutional search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
Constrained by the ruling in Weeks, requiring exclusion of
evidence obtained through unlawful searches, in order to affIrm
Olmstead's convictions, the Court had to conclude that the
wiretapping was not a search. 36 Over the vigorous dissent of
four justices, the Court did precisely that.
Justice Bradley, in the Boyd Case ... said that the ...
Fourth Amendment ... [was] to be liberally construed
to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution
in the interest of liberty. But that cannot justify
enlargement of the language employed beyond the
possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers,
and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure
as to forbid hearing or sight.
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of
telephone messages by making them, when intercepted,
inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by
direct legislation, and thus depart from the common
law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a
policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning
to the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable view is that
one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to
those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his
house, and messages while passing over them, are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here
those who intercepted the projected voices were not in
the house of either party to the conversation.
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many
federal decisions brought to our attention hold the
Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant, unless there has been an official search and
seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or
his tangible material effects or an actual physical

35.

36.

Jd. at 456-57.
Jd. at 466-68.
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invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of
making a seizure.
We think, therefore, that the wiretapping here
disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 3?
The Court did not disguise its opinion that the police conduct
at issue was, perhaps, unscrupulous; however, the court found it
more important that criminals be brought to justice. 38 Indeed, in
a rather blatant nod to the majority's perceived superior
capabilities of law enforcement in such matters, the Court
cautioned that "[i]n the absence of controlling legislation by
Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders
to justice may well deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence
should be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution
would be violated by admitting it.,,39 Because there had been no
trespass on Olmstead's property, there had been no search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, with
advancing technology, the Olmstead holding became
increasingly problematic. 40 Indeed, Justice Brennan noted "that
its authority has been steadily sapped by subsequent decisions of
the Court .... "41
In Goldman v. United States ,42 federal agents used "a
detectaphone" placed against a partition wall to overhear
conversations in the office next door where Goldman was
meeting with other conspirators. The conversations were
introduced into evidence, over objection, at Goldman's trial. In
only two paragraphs, the Court turned aside Goldman's claim
that his Fourth Amendment right to privacy had been violated.
In asking us to hold that the information obtained was

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
that its use at the trial was, therefore, banned by the
Amendment, the petitioners recognize that they must
37.
38.

39.

40.
41.

42.

!d. at 465-66.
Id. at 468. "A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if
obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would
make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known
heretofore." Id.
Id.
See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 458-59 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Id.
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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reckon with our decision in [OlmsteadJ .... They
argue that the case may be distinguished.
The
suggested ground of distinction is that the Olmstead
case dealt with the tapping of telephone wires, and the
court adverted to the fact that, in using a telephone, the
speaker projects his voice beyond the confines of his
home or office and, therefore, assumes the risk that his
message may be intercepted. It is urged that where, as
in the present case, one talks in his own office, and
intends his conversation to be confined within the four
walls of the room, he does not intend his voice shall go
beyond those walls and it is not to be assumed he takes
the risk of someone's use of a delicate detector in the
next room. We think, however, the distinction is too
nice for practical application of the Constitutional
guarantee and no reasonable or logical distinction can
be drawn between what federal agents did in the
present case and state officers did in the Olmstead case.
The petitioners ask us, if we are unable to distinguish
[OlmsteadJ ... to overrule it. This we are unwilling to
do.
That case was the subject of prolonged
consideration by this court. The views of the court, and
of the dissenting justices, were expressed clearly and at
length. To rehearse and reappraise the arguments pro
and con, and the conflicting views exhibited in the
opinions, would serve no good purpose. Nothing now
can be profitably added to what was there said. It
suffices to say that we adhere to the opinion there
expressed. 43
Justice Murphy, in his dissent, was particularly troubled by the
continued reliance on property law and the trespass doctrine. 44
He noted:
There was no physical entry in this case. But the search
of one's home or office no longer requires physical
entry, for science has brought forth far more effective
devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the
direct and obvious methods of oppression which were

43.
44.

Id. at 135-36 (citation omitted).
Id. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth
Amendment. 4s
A chink in the Olmstead annor appeared when Silverman v.
United Statei 6 reached the Court. There, federal agents used a
"spike mike" to overhear conversations in Silvennan's home. 47
The instrument in question was a microphone with a
spike about a foot long attached to it together with an
amplifier, a power pack, and earphones. The officers
inserted the spike under a baseboard in a second-floor
room of the vacant house and into a crevice extending
several inches into the party wall, until the spike hit
something solid "that acted as a very good sounding
board." The record clearly indicates that the spike
made contact with a heating duct serving the house
occupied by the petitioners thus converting their entire
heating system into a conductor of sound. 48
The overheard conversations were introduced, over objection,
into evidence at Silverman's trial for gambling offenses. 49
Noting the importance of the fact that the spike mike made
contact with the "heating system, which was an integral part of
[Silvennan's] premises,"so the Court concluded that this violated
the Fourth Amendment because it was an "intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area."Sl Notwithstanding the many
references
to
trespassing--e.g.,
"eavesdropping
was
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration
into the premises,,,s2 "unauthorized physical encroachment,,,53
"physical invasion of premises,,,s4-the Court quizzically ended
its opinion with the following language:
Here, by contrast, the officers overheard the
petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 506--07.
Id.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 511-12.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
Id.
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petitioners' house or office-a heating system which
was an integral part of the premises occupied by the
petitioners, a usurpation that was effected without their
knowledge and without their consent.
In these
circumstances we need not pause to consider whether
or not there was a technical trespass under the local
property law relating to party walls. Inherent Fourth
Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in
terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law. 55
Thus, in a single opinion, the Court disavowed the application
of property law concepts in Fourth Amendment cases while at
the same time placed critical importance on the fact that the
agents had physically intruded upon Silverman's premises
without his consent. 56 And thus began a steady shift away from
property and trespass concepts in defining a search in Fourth
Amendment cases and a turn toward privacy rights. 57
A mere seven months before the landmark decision in Katz,
the Court seemed to put to rest any notion that property law
applies in Fourth Amendment analyses. 58 In Warden v.
Hayden,s9 the Court made the following pronouncement:
The premise that property interests control the right of
the Government to search and seize has been
discredited.
Searches and seizures may be
"unreasonable" within the Fourth Amendment even
though the Government asserts a superior property
interest at common law. We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
protection of privacy rather than property, and have
increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers
rested on property concepts. 60
However, the Court in Warden only added to the confusion
when it stated that its decision in Silverthorne Lumber CO.,61
decided in 1920, marked the escape from "the bounds of
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 511 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part II.
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920).

457

458

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

common law property limitations... when it became
established that suppression might be sought during a criminal
trial, and under circumstances which would not sustain an action
in trespass or replevin.,,62 Of course, such a claim completely
ignored the decisions in Goldman, Olmstead, Agnello, Hester,
and Amos,63 all decided post-Silverthorne Lumber Co. and all
relying on property law concepts. The claim in Warden, that
property law concepts had long ago been discredited, only
serves to reinforce Professor Amar's cogent observation that in
this area of the law, the Court's decisions have resulted in "a
vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely
complex and contradictory, but often perverse.,,64
II. DEFINING A SEARCH WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: FROM PROPERTY
RIGHTS TO PRIVACY RIGHTS

A. The Katz Decision
In 1967, police suspected that Charles Katz was engaging in a
bookmaking operation and was using public telephones to
transmit information in violation of federal law. 65 Katz used a
particular glass telephone booth from which to make many of
his calls. 66 Federal agents, unbeknownst to Katz, attached a
listening device to the top of the telephone booth, which allowed
them to overhear and record bookmaking conversations engaged
in by Katz.67 At trial, Katz unsuccessfully objected, on Fourth
Amendment grounds, to the introduction of the recordings. 68
The issues that ultimately made their way to the United States
Supreme Court were twofold: whether a telephone booth is a
constitutionally protected area, and if so, whether physical
intrusion into the booth is required before a Fourth Amendment
challenge could be raised. 69 The framing of the issues in this

62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Warden, 387 U.S. at 304-05 (citation omitted).
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, l34-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
30-33 (1925); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-17 (1921).
Warden, 387 U.S. at 304-05; supra note 1, at 757-58.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348, 354 (1967).
/d. at 352.
/d. at 348-49.
/d.
/d. at 349-50.
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manner seems perfectly reasonable in light of the cases
discussed above. However, again proving Professor Amar's
point, the Court chastised counsel as having framed the issues in
a "misleading" manner. 70 This is so, the Court stated, because:
[T]his effort to decide whether or not a given "area,"
viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected"
deflects attention from the problem presented by this
case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. 71
The Court specifically addressed the use of the trespass
doctrine in this way:
The Government contends, however, that the
activities of its agents in this case should not be tested
by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the
surveillance technique they employed involved no
physical penetration of the telephone booth from which
the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the
absence of such penetration was at one time thought to
foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, for that
Amendment was thought to limit only searches and
seizures of tangible property. But "[t]he premise that
property interests control the right of the Government
to search and seize has been discredited." Thus,
although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead
that surveillance without any trespass and without the
seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of
the Constitution, we have since departed from the
narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we
have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment
governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements
overheard without any "technical trespass under . ..
local property law." Once this much is acknowledged,
and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protects people-and not simply "areas "-against
70.
71.

See id. at 352-53.
/d. at 351.
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unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent
decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling. The
Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve
that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth can have no constitutional significance. 72
To a certain degree, the majority opinion in Katz remarkably
reads as if the Court were annoyed that counsel on both sides
had addressed the facts using a theory of trespass as applied to a
"constitutionally protected area" as if such a theory had no
precedents in Supreme Court case law. 73 Ironically, however,
Justice Stewart who wrote for the majority in Katz, was also the
architect of the majority opinion in Silverman, which held "[the]
decision here does not tum upon the technicality of a trespass
upon a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon the
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area.,,74

72.
73.

74.

Id. at 352-53 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
Although the Court gave lip service in a single footnote to its prior references
to "constitutionally protected areas," in the same footnote the Court dismissed
reliance on such a standard stating, "It is true that this Court has occasionally
described its conclusions in terms of 'constitutionally protected areas,' but we
have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to
every Fourth Amendment problem." See id. at 352 n.9 (citations omitted).
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (emphasis added). It
appears that introduction of the phrase "constitutionally protected area" in the
context of Fourth Amendment cases was first introduced by Justice Stewart in
the Silverman decision. See Charles H. Rogers, The Fourth Amendment and
Evidence Obtained by a Government Agent's Trespass, 42 NEB. L. REv. 166,
166-67 (1962) (explaining the Court's usage of the constitutionally protected
area test as applied to the Fourth Amendment in Silverman).
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Ultimately, the Court held that in order to conduct electronic
surveillance, the government must, unless national security is at
stake, obtain prior approval from a judge. 75
[The government] argues that surveillance of a
telephone booth should be exempted from the usual
requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate
upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree.
Omission of such authorization "bypasses the
safeguards provided by an objective predetermination
of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less
reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for
the ... search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." And
bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a
search leaves individuals secure from Fourth
Amendment violations "only in the discretion of the
police."
These considerations do not vanish when the search
in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an
office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth.
Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he
will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The government agents here ignored "the
procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central
to the Fourth Amendment," a procedure that we hold to
be a constitutional precondition of the kind of
electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because
the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and
because it led to the petitioner's conviction, the
judgment must be reversed. 76
For the first time, the Court unequivocally held that electronic
surveillance, even in the absence of a trespass, constituted a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 77
75.
76.
77.

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-59 & n.23.
Id. at 358-59 (footnote omitted) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96
(1964».
See id. at 353. That this was a clear repudiation of prior decisions that required
a trespass in order to invoke the application of the Fourth Amendment was
solidified by the Court's later decision in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
247-48 (1969), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, (1987). In
determining whether Katz should be subject to retroactive or prospective
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It is difficult, however, to construe from the majority opinion a
meaningful test for determining if conduct by the government
constitutes a search, with or without trespassing. 78 This is
probably why Justice Harlan felt the need to file a concurring
opinion distilling such a test from the majority opinion. Justice
Harlan wrote:
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold
only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area
where, like a home, ... and unlike a field, ... a person
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and
(c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area
by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held,
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search
warrant.
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth
The
Amendment protects people, not places."
question, however, is what protection it affords to those
people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question
requires reference to a "place." My understanding of
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not
"protected" because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited. On the other hand,
conversations in the open would not be protected

78.

application, the Desist court held that "[w]hile decisions before Katz may have
reflected growing dissatisfaction with the traditional tests of the constitutional
validity of electronic surveillance, the Court consistently reiterated those tests
and declined invitations to abandon them. However clearly our holding in Katz
may have been foreshadowed, it was a clear break with the past, and we are
thus compelled to decide whether its application should be limited to the
future." Desist, 394 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable ....
The critical fact in this case is that "[0Jne who
occupies it, [a telephone boothJ shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume" that his conversation is not
being intercepted. . .. The point is not that the booth is
'accessible to the public' at other times, ... but that it
is a temporarily private place whose momentary
occupants" expectations of freedom from intrusion are
recognized as reasonable. 79
Justice Harlan's test certainly provided more guidance than
the majority opinion, and turned the focus to privacy interests
rather than property interests. Post-Katz Supreme Court cases
reflected this change in focus. 8o
B. The Advance a/Technology Post-Katz

The focus on privacy rights could not have come at a more
fortuitous time as technology began to advance beyond the
relatively benign eavesdropping techniques used prior to Katz,
i.e., the detectaphone in Goldman and the spike mike in
Silverman. 81 Many of the pre-Katz techniques used by police
79.
80.

81.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984) (holding that
petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields on his own
property notwithstanding the trespass by government agents to view the open
field); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980) (holding that
petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a purse
belonging to another even though he admitted that he owned the drugs found
within the purse); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979),
superseded by statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (holding that petitioner had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed as it is generally
known that the numbers one dials are transferred to the telephone company
who has facilities to record the numbers).
Compare Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (involving the
use of a spike mike); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)
(involving the use of a detectaphone), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), with discussion infra Part II.B (noting the technology used in
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (involving the use of a thermalimaging device); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (involving the
use of aerial surveillance); Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229
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required some type of physical intrusion and posed no real
difficulty in concluding it was a search by relying on property
rights. This is not to say that the focus on privacy rights created
an easy resolution when addressing advancing technology and
its effect on the Fourth Amendment. 82 While it may, in most
cases, be relatively easy to discern whether or not one has
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, it is no easy task
to determine whether or not that expectation is one that society
would recognize as reasonable. 83 In other words, precisely who
is this "society"? The Harlan test presumes a homogenous
society that any judge, at any time, could easily channel when
making a determination that an expectation of privacy is one
society would consider reasonable. 84 But the test actually
generates far more questions than it answers and leaves the
societal reasonableness of an expectation of privacy at the mercy
of the speed with which technology is put into general use. 85
The following cases demonstrate the advance in technology and
the Court's efforts to apply the Katz test to that technology.
United States v. Knotts concerned the placement of a beeper
device in a five-gallon container of chloroform, which was then
tracked to Knotts' property. 86 Government officials had reason
to believe that the chloroform was being used to produce
methamphetamine and other illicit drugs. 87 The government
agents followed the truck where the chloroform was placed by a
co-conspirator. 88 It was ultimately taken to Knotts. Based on

82.

83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

(1986) (involving the use of aerial photography); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 708 (1984) (involving the use of a beeper); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276,277 (1983) (involving the use ofa beeper)).
See generally Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth
Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. LJ. 51, 72 (2002)
(explaining the failings of the Katz decision as applied to advancing technology
and its impact on the Fourth Amendment).
In later cases the Court notes that an expectation of privacy is "reasonable"
when it is consistent with "widely shared social expectations." Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). The Court has stated that there is "no
talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable," O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715
(1987) (plurality opinion), and simply measures the reasonableness in terms of
"the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share." Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
Id. at 278.
ld.
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this tracking information, as well as other details, the
government was able to secure a search warrant for the property,
and upon execution, found a drug lab. 89 Upon his arrest and
trial, Knotts challenged the monitoring of the beeper on Fourth
Amendment grounds. 90 When the case reached the United
States Supreme Court, the Court held that no search or seizure
had occurred when monitoring the beeper specifically because:
A person travelling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another. When
[the co-defendant] travelled over the public streets he
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made,
and the fact of his final destination when he exited
from public roads onto private property.91
Citing the "limited use" of the beeper and the fact that it did
not reveal "information as to the movement of the drum within
the cabin," the Court concluded that there had been no search. 92
Significantly, the Court held that nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the government from "augmenting the
sensory facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such
enhancement as science and technology afforded them. ,,93
One year after the decision in Knotts, the Court again
addressed the validity of the government's use of a beeper in
United States v. Karo. 94 After receiving a tip that Karo and his
cohorts would be using ether to extract cocaine from clothing
imported into the United States, agents placed a beeper into a
can of ether and monitored its movements over a period of
several weeks.95 During that time, the can was moved from
commercial storage lockers and ultimately taken to the residence

89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.
95.

ld. at 279.
ld. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
ld. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
ld. at 284-85. Because it had not been raised below, the Court refused to
address the question whether or not placing the beeper into the container, as
opposed to simply monitoring it, constituted a search. See id. at n.**
ld. at 282.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708-11 (1984).
ld. at 708-10.
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of one of the defendants. 96 Agents confirmed the presence of the
can in the residence through use of the beeper device and
obtained a warrant to search the residence. 97 The search
revealed cocaine and laboratory equipment used in the
extraction process. 98 The government asserted that the case was
controlled by Knotts and that no search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment had occurred because agents, through
visual observation, could easily have verified that the can was
carried into the home. 99 Turning aside this reasoning, the Court
held:
In this case, had a DEA agent thought it useful to enter
the Taos residence to verify that the ether was actually
in the house and had he done so surreptitiously and
without a warrant, there is little doubt that he would
have engaged in an unreasonable search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For purposes of
the Amendment, the result is the same where, without a
warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs an
electronic device to obtain information that it could not
have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage
of the house. The beeper tells the agent that a
particular article is actually located at a particular time
in the private residence and is in the possession of the
person or persons whose residence is being watched.
Even if visual surveillance has revealed that the article
to which the beeper is attached has entered the house,
the later monitoring not only verifies the officers'
observations but also establishes that the article
remains on the premises. Here, for example, the beeper
was monitored for a significant period after the arrival
of the ether in Taos and before the application for a
warrant to search.
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a
beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale
search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the
interior of the premises that the Government is
extremely interested in knowing and that it could not
have otherwise obtained without a warrant. The case is
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 709-10.
Jd. at 713-16.
See id. at 713-16.
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thus not like Knotts, for there the beeper told the
authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts' cabin.
The infonnation obtained in Knotts was "voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look ... "; here, as
we have said, the monitoring indicated that the beeper
was inside the house, a fact that could not have been
visually verified.
We cannot accept the Government's contention that it
should be completely free from the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment to detennine by means of an
electronic device, without a warrant and without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a
particular article-or a person, for that matter-is in an
individual's home at a particular time. Indiscriminate
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some
sort of Fourth Amendment oversight. 100
Thus, the critical difference between Knotts and Karo is that
the infonnation revealed by monitoring the beeper in Karo,
unlike in Knotts, could not have been learned through visual
observation even if that observation were enhanced with
technology. 101
It is doubtful that anyone would have predicted that the
Court's reference in Knotts to augmentation of sensory facilities
with "science and technology," would include aerial
surveillance. Nevertheless, a mere three years after the decision
in Knotts, the Court concluded that aerial surveillance did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 102
In
California v. Ciraolo, officers received an anonymous tip that
Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard. 103 The officers
attempted to view the plants from the ground level but were
unable to do so because of a six-foot high outer fence
surrounding a ten-foot high inner fence constructed around the
area. 104 Officers secured a private plane that flew over the yard

100.
IOJ.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 715-16 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 713-15.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207-08 (1986).
Id. at 209.
Id.
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at a navigable air space of 1,000 feet. 105 The officers onboard,
using a standard 35-mm camera, photographed the plants and
subsequently used the photographs, inter alia, to obtain a search
warrant. 106 Execution of the warrant resulted in the seizure of
marijuana plants. l07 Focusing on the second prong of Katz, that
is, the reasonableness of one's subjective expectation of privacy,
the Court held:
In an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for
respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the
naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth
Amendment simply does not require the police
traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain
a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the
naked eye. 108

The Court's focus on the type of surveillance used by police
misses the point entirely. The focus instead should have been on
those privacy interests that a free society would deem reasonable
and not on what type of technology could be used to easily
overcome that interest in privacy.
The analysis used in Ciraolo was also applied in its
companion case of Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, where
agents of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought to
conduct a second inspection of the sprawling 2,000 acre facility
owned by Dow Chemical. 109 The agents had earlier conducted
an on-site inspection with Dow's consent. The second request
was denied by Dow.llo Without seeking an administrative
search warrant, the EPA agents hired an aerial photographer
using "the finest precision aerial camera available" to film "a
great deal more than the human eye could ever see."lll Dow
sought, and was awarded, injunctive relief preventing further
photography of its facilities. 112 The court of appeals reversed

lOS.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 212-15.

109.
110.
Ill.
112.

Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 230.
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finding that Dow had a subjective expectation of privacy in its
ground-level operations, but because Dow had taken no similar
precautions to preclude aerial observation, there was no
subjective expectation of privacy. 113 Among other arguments
made in the Supreme Court, Dow contended that "EPA's use of
aerial photography was a 'search' of an area that,
notwithstanding the large size of the plant, was within an
'industrial curtilage' rather than an 'open field,' and that it had a
reasonable expectation of privacy from such photography
protected by the Fourth Amendment.,,1l4 Finding that no search
under the Fourth Amendment had taken place, the Court held:
Oliver recognized that in the open field context, "the
public and police lawfully may survey lands from the
air." Here, EPA was not employing some unique
sensory device that, for example, could penetrate the
walls of buildings and record conversations in Dow's
plants, offices, or laboratories, but rather a
conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera
commonly used in mapmaking. The Government
asserts it has not yet enlarged the photographs to any
significant degree, but Dow points out that simple
magnification permits identification of objects such as
wires as small as 112-inch in diameter.
It may well be, as the Government concedes, that
surveillance of private property by using highly
sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally
available to the public, such as satellite technology,
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.
But the photographs here are not so revealing of
intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.
Although they undoubtedly give EPA more detailed
information than naked-eye views, they remain limited
to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment.
The mere fact that human vision is enhanced
somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise
to constitutional problems. An electronic device to
penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record
confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other

113. Id.
114. Id. at 232-33.
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trade secrets would raise very different and far more
serious questions; other protections such as trade secret
laws are available to protect commercial activities from
private surveillance by competitors. I 15
As noted by the dissenting opinion, the rationale employed by
the majority to conclude that no search had occurred completely
ignored the fundamental basis of Katz. I 16 "Katz measures Fourth
Amendment rights by reference to the privacy interests that a
free society recognizes as reasonable, not by reference to the
method of surveillance used in the particular case. If the Court's
observations were to become the basis of a new Fourth
Amendment standard that would replace the rule in Katz,
privacy rights would be seriously at risk as technological
advances become generally disseminated and available in our
society.,,117
The irrationality of the Court's interpretation of what is a
reasonable expectation of privacy reached its nadir when four
justices applied its holding in Ciraolo to police flying a
helicopter over a roofed greenhouse at a level of 400 feet in
Florida v. Riley. I 18 The area surveyed by the police was
described:
A greenhouse was located 10 to 20 feet behind the
mobile home. Two sides of the greenhouse were
enclosed. The other two sides were not enclosed but
the contents of the greenhouse were obscured from
view from surrounding property by trees, shrubs, and
the mobile home. The greenhouse was covered by
corrugated roofing panels, some translucent and some
opaque. At the time relevant to this case, two of the
panels, amounting to approximately 10% of the roof
area, were mIssmg. A wire fence surrounded the
mobile home and the greenhouse, and the property was
posted with a "DO NOT ENTER" sign.119

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

ld. at 238-39 (footnote omitted).
ld. at 251 (Powell, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
ld.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,447-49 (1989).
ld. at 448.
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After receiving a tip that marijuana was being grown in the
greenhouse, police flew a helicopter over the area at a height of
400 feet. Citing Ciraoio, the Court held:
Any member of the public could legally have been
flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the
altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley's
greenhouse. The police officer did no more. This is
not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house
from an aircraft will always pass muster under the
Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within
the navigable airspace specified by law. But it is of
obvious importance that the helicopter in this case was
not violating the law, and there is nothing in the record
or before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400
feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend
substance to respondent's claim that he reasonably
anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to
observation from that altitude. 120
The dissenters in this case used various suitable terms to
describe the plurality's holding that because police had a right to
be where they were and because any member of the public could
fly overhead in a helicopter, an expectation of privacy in a
covered area within the curtilage of one's home was not
reasonable: "disingenuous,,,121 "unfortunate,,,122 "remarkable,,,123
"curious," 124 "misguided,,,125 "incredible," 126 "disconcerting," 127
and "puzzling." 128
The unsound reasoning of the plurality opinion in Riley is only
highlighted by the Court's later effort to distinguish it in Bond v.
United States. 129 In Bond, a border patrol agent boarded a bus
after it had stopped at a rest area.13o Border Patrol Agent Cantu
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 46l.
Id. at 458 n.l, 463.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460 n.2.
Id. at 46l.
Id. at 462.
See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000).
Id. at 335.
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boarded the bus "to check the immigration status of its
passengers."l3l When Agent Cantu began to walk from the rear
of the bus to the front, he "squeezed the soft luggage which
passengers had placed in the overhead storage space above the
seats."\32 As Agent Cantu did so, he felt a "brick-like object" in
a bag belonging to Bond.133 After Bond admitted that the bag
belonged to him, he agreed to allow Cantu to open it. 134 Upon
doing so, Agent Cantu discovered a "brick" of
methamphetamine and arrested Bond. 135 When the Bond case
reached the Supreme Court, the government argued, relying on
Ciraolo, that "by exposing his bag to the public, [Bond] lost a
reasonable expectation that his bag would not be physically
manipulated.,,136 The Court held, "Ciraolo and Riley are
different from this case because they involved only visual, as
opposed to tactile, observation. Physically invasive inspection is
simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."137 Thus,
police may employ an airplane or helicopter pilot to fly over
one's home and, using high powered equipment, take
photographs that may reveal intimate activities within the
curtilage of the home, and should a window be uncovered, those
within the home;138 but they best not touch one's luggage kept in
an overhead compartment on a public bus.
The forward march of science and technology and its
consequent effect on privacy rights came under closer scrutiny
in Kyllo v. United States, 139 where the Court confronted the
question of what, if any, "limits there are upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."14o
Federal agents suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana inside his
residence. 141 Because high-powered lights generating copious
amounts of heat are needed for growing the plants, police
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

/d.
Jd.
Jd. at 335-36.
Id.
Jd.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(200 I), noted that "the technology enabling human flight has exposed to public
view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of
the house and its curtilage that once were private." Id. at 34.
139. Id. at 33-34.
140. Id. at 34.
141. ld.at29.
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compared Kyllo's electrical bills with those of his neighbors and
confirmed that they were excessive. 142 To further confirm their
suspicions, agents used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal
imager to scan Kyllo's home as well as his neighbors' homes. 143
The thermal imager was directed at the homes from inside an
agent's car parked on the public street. l44 The scan "detect[s]
infrared radiation" not visible to the naked eye. 145 The scan
lasted only a few minutes. 146 It showed "that the roof over the
garage and a side wall of [Kyllo's] home were relatively hot
compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than
neighboring homes .... ,,147
Using this information, agents obtained a search warrant and
discovered a marijuana growing operation. 148 The government
contended before the Court that the use of the thermal imaging
device from a public vantage point did not constitute a search as
it did not reveal activities within the home. To this point the
Court held:
The Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has
never been tied to measurement of the quality or
quantity of information obtained. In Silverman, for
example, we made clear that any physical invasion of
the structure of the home, "by even a fraction of an
inch," was too much, and there is certainly no
exception to the warrant requirement for the officer
who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing
but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor. In the
home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes. Thus, in Karo, the only thing
detected was a can of ether in the home; and in Arizona
v. Hicks, the only thing detected by a physical search
that went beyond what officers lawfully present could
observe in "plain view" was the registration number of
a phonograph turntable. These were intimate details
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 29-30.
at 27, 30.
at 29.
at 30.
at 30.
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because they were details of the home, just as was the
detail of how warm--or even how relatively warmKyllo was heating his residence. 149
One troubling aspect of the decision in Kyllo concerns the
Court's apparent willingness to conclude that no search occurs
when the technology used by the government is also in general
public use. ISO The Court reaffirms the sanctity of the home and
acknowledges the clear existence of an expectation of privacy in
one's home.
We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws "a
firm line at the entrance to the house," . . .. That line,
we think, must be not only firm but also bright-which
requires clear specification of those methods of
surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly
possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal
imaging that occurred in this case that no "significant"
compromise of the homeowner's privacy has occurred,
we must take the long view, from the original meaning
of the Fourth Amendment forward. 151
At the same time, however, the Court also stated:
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area," constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use.
This assures preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth
On the basis of this
Amendment was adopted.
criterion, the information obtained by the thermal
imager in this case was the product of a search. 152
The Court does not define "general public use" but simply
notes in a footnote, citing Oraolo, that use of the thermal
imaging technology was not "routine."153 This is hardly a "clear
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 37-38 (citation omitted).
at 34-35.
at 40 (citation omitted).
at 34-35 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
at 39 n.6.
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specification of those methods of surveillance that require a
warrant.,,154 Nor does it promote confidence that there indeed is
a bright line at the entrance to one's home over which police
may not validly step without a warrant. 155
Given the rationale of Kyllo, one would expect that technology
that is commonplace and routinely used by the general public
can also be used by police without a warrant and without
implicating the Fourth Amendment. But that "long view" taken
by the Court in 2001 did not last very long at all.
III. AND THEN ALONG CAME JONES I56
Federal agents suspected Antoine Jones of trafficking drugs. 157
Agents conducted surveillance both visually and with cameras
fixed on a nightclub owned by Jones. 158 They also relied on a
pen register and wiretap of his cell phone. 159 Based on the
information gathered from these sources, the government sought
and obtained authority to place a Global Positioning System
(GPS) device on a Jeep Cherokee owned by Jones's wife but
driven mainly by Jones. 160 The warrant permitted the placement
of the device on the Cherokee but required that it be done in
Washington, D.C., and within ten days. 161 Ignoring these
constraints, on the eleventh day after obtaining the warrant, the
government placed the device on the Jeep while it was parked
on a public parking lot in Maryland. 162 The device was placed
on the undercarriage of the Jeep and remained there for a period
of 28 days. 163 "By means of signals from multiple satellites, the
device established the vehicle's location within 50 to 100 feet,
and communicated that location by cellular phone to a
Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data

154. Id. at 40.
155. See id.
156. "Along Came Jones" is a song written by Jerry Leiber and Mike Stoller and
originally recorded by The Coasters in 1959. THE COASTERS, ALONG CAME
JONES (Atco 6141) (1959).
157. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.at947,949n.2.
161. Id. at 947.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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over the four-week period."I64 Jones was tried jointly with
Lawrence Maynard and was convicted. 165
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, Jones contended that his reasonable expectation of
privacy was violated by the twenty-four-hour-a-day tracking of
his movements while in the Jeep. 166
For its part, the
government, relying on Knotts, contended that there had been no
search because one has no reasonable expectation of privacy
while traveling on public roads. 167 Seizing upon language in
Knotts, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that the type of twentyfour-hour surveillance involved in Jones's case was expressly
not addressed in Knotts. 168
Most important for the present case, the Court [in
Knotts] specifically reserved the question whether a
warrant would be required in a case involving "twentyfour hour surveillance," stating[:]
if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur,
there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable. 169
In other words, the issue reserved in Knotts as unnecessary to
its holding was "squarely presented" in Jones's case. 170 The
appellate court took pains to address the difference between the
prolonged tracking of Jones via GPS, and the mere "movements
from one place to another" by the government in Knotts.17I The
court meticulously distinguished the movements of Jones from
that of Knotts and concluded:

[W]e hold the whole of a person's movements over the
course of a month is not actually exposed to the public
because the likelihood a stranger would observe all
164. Id.
165. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 2010), a./f'd in part
sub nom, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
166. Id. at 555.
167. Id. at 555-56.
168. Id. at 556-57.
169. Id. at 556 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)).
170. Id. at 558.
171. Id. at 557.
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those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to

follow someone during a single journey as he goes to
the market or returns home from work. It is another
thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent
again the next day and the day after that, week in and
week out, dogging his prey until he has identified all
the places, people, amusements, and chores that make
up that person's hitherto private routine.172
In short, the court concluded: "The difference is not one of
degree but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits and
patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life and a
way of life .... "173 The court was unconcerned, with good
reason given the shift from property rights to privacy rights,
with the government's trespass to lones's property. 174
Few could have anticipated the outcome of Jones in the
Supreme Court. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by the
Government sought review of the lower court's ruling, arguing
that GPS tracking is not a search at all because one has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in movements made in
public. 175 The Brief in Opposition to the Government's request
for certiorari asked that if the Court were to grant review, it also
consider the question of whether the actual installation of the
GPS device constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 176
In support of this, Jones stated,
In this case, "the police not only engaged in
surveillance by GPS but also intruded (albeit briefly
and slightly) on the defendant's personal property,
namely his car, to install the GPS device on the vehicle
.... " Just as "squeezing [the] outer surface of a bag"
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,... the

172.
173.
174.
175.

ld. at 566-59, 560.
ld. at 562.
See id. at 556-58, 563--{)5.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, United States v. Jones, 615 F.3d 544
(2011) (No. 10-1259),2011 WL 1462758, at *11-12.
176. Brief in Opposition at 2, Jones, 615 F.3d 544 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL
2263361, at *2.
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government's installation of a device on Jones's
private vehicle constitutes a search. 177
The grant of certiorari included the additional issue proposed
by Jones. 178 In its brief, the Government contended that placing
the device on Jones's car was not a search because there can be
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of one's
vehicle. 179 Jones countered,
The Fourth Amendment protects "property as well as
privacy." Its protections take account of property law
concepts not only because they aid in determining
whether the government has committed a seizure, ...
but also because they are an important and sometimes
dispositive consideration in determining whether a
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable. 180
Clearly, the argument of both parties centered on satisfying
the two-pronged test of Katz. The references to property rights
made by Jones were in support of his contention that his
expectation of privacy was reasonable and did not rely on the
trespass doctrine. 18l
Thus, when the Supreme Court ruled in Jones's favor, the
rationale it relied on in doing so was surprising.
The Government contends that the Harlan standard
shows that no search occurred here, since Jones had no
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area of the
Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody)
and in the locations of the Jeep on the public roads,
which were visible to all. But we need not address the
Government's contentions, because Jones's Fourth
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz
formulation.
At bottom, we must "assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against
177. Id.
178. Grant of Certiorari, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 101259).
179. Brief for United States at 39, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No.
10-1259),2011 WL 3561881, at *20.
180. Brief for Respondent at 17, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 2011 WL 4479076, at *12.
(quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992)).
181. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
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government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted." As explained, for most of our history
the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a
particular concern for government trespass upon the
areas ("persons, houses, papers, and effects") it
enumerates. 182
At bottom, the Court concluded, "the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted
jor, the common-law trespassory test.,,183 The Court made clear
that its trespass theory did not apply, as contended by Justice
Alito in his concurrence, to "any technical trespass that led to
the gathering of evidence."184 Rather, it applies only to
trespasses to persons, houses, papers, and effects enumerated in
the Fourth Amendment itself. 185 But while the majority insists
that "technical" trespasses "don't count," they certainly did
count when the Amendment was adopted. 186 Recall the opinion
in Entick, which, ironically, Justice Scalia supportively cites in
Jones:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man
can set his foot upon my ground without my license,
but he is liable to an action, though the damage be
nothing, which is proved by every declaration in
trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer
for bruising the grass and even treading upon the
soil. 187
It is unfortunate that the Court chose in Jones not to apply the
Katz test because today's technology permits continued
surveillance of one's movements over a long period of time
without trespassing on one's property or effects. Thus, in those
types of cases, Jones provides no guidance on the question of
whether the use of non-trespassory technology would constitute
182. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
183. Id. at 952.
184. Id. at 953 n.8 (Alito, J., concurring).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 949; supra note 184 and accompanying text.
187. Entick v. Carrington, 95 E.R. 807 (1765) (emphasis added), quoted in Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 949.
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a search or seizure. The Court dodged the most important
question presented in the case: whether intrusive surveillance of
an individual invades a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Given advances in technology and the amount of information
about an individual's life such technology can gather and track,
the answer to that question is critical. Further, there is no
guidance as to what constitutes a "technical" trespass, which the
majority seems to suggest would not present a Fourth
Amendment problem. And finally, the decision provides no
guidance for police in determining whether they must obtain a
warrant before using non-trespassory GPS tracking. In short,
the Court seems only to have kicked the can down the road.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF KATZ AND JONES IN THE 21 ST
CENTURY
Putting aside for the moment whether the trespass doctrine has
been alive and well all along in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the fact remains that neither the trespass
doctrine-relied upon in Jones-nor the expectation of privacy
doctrine-relied upon in Katz-provides adequate guidance to
law enforcement units seeking, quite properly, to use ever more
advancing technology in criminal investigations. Nor does
either of those tests adequately protect privacy interests of
citizens subject to those criminal investigations using advanced
non-tres~assory technology. 188
The latest technology in
tracking 89 allows police to stay one step ahead of the trespass
188. Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority in Jones, stated that "[S]ituations
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass remain
subject to Katz analysis. . .. It may be that achieving the same result through
electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy .... " Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54. This recognition that
searches without trespass remain subject to the Katz legitimate expectation of
privacy test adds nothing to the debate about what would be considered a
"legitimate" expectation of privacy in the advanced digital age in which we
live.
189. For example, consider, AKELA, THROUGH THE WALL STANDOFF DETECTION
AND TRACKING OF INDNIDUALS: REpORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Apr. 30, 2012), available at
https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnijlgrants/240231.pdf. The report provides a
summary of the technology that a corporation named AKELA is developing for
law enforcement use.
AKELA Inc. developed a sense-through-the-wall (SITW) standoff
radar imaging system for law enforcement use. The underlying
technology of the imaging system is a multiple antenna, continuous
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prohibition while gathering an extraordina2' amount of
information about a person's private life. 19
Thus, the
celebratory note struck by several commentators since the
release of the Jones decision is perplexing. For example, an
attorney who filed an amicus brief on behalf of Jones referred to
the Court's decision as a "landmark ruling in applying the
Fourth Amendment's protections to advances in surveillance
technology.,,191 It is hardly a "landmark" ruling because the
Court dodged the critical issue. l92 Instead of reviving the
trespass doctrine, the facts in Jones provided the Court with an
opportunity to address a more fundamental concern that will no
doubt crop up again in the very near future: the effect, if any,
technology should have on the reasonableness calculation of
societal expectations of privacy.
wave, frequency stepping radar in a portable case that can be
positioned at standoff distances of up to 30 m away from a building
of interest. Radar information is processed in real time on a laptop
computer to allow detection and tracking of stationary or moving
individuals within a building structure.
The project goals were to provide an easy to use, battery operated,
FCC compliant, portable system weighing less than 15 Ibs, at a total
system cost of less than $5,000, that detects personnel behind an
eight inch thick concrete block wall at a range of 30 meters, is
capable of being controlled by a wireless Ethernet connection
allowing remote deployment and operation, and produces images
identifying stationary and moving individuals within building
structures.
fd. at 3.
190. See, The Drones Are Coming, But Our Laws Aren't Ready,
http://www.nbcne~s.comltechnology/technologldrones-are-coming-our-Iaws

arent-ready-I C9006243.
191. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Warrants Needed in GPS Tracking, WASH.
POST (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.comlpolitics/supreme-courtwarrants-needed-in-gps-trackingl20 12/0 1/23/glQAx7qGLO_story.html;
see
also Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Decides the GPS Case, United States
v. Jones, and the Fourth Amendment Evolves, VERDICT JUSTIA (Feb. 15,2012),
http://verdict.justia.coml20 12/021 15/the-supreme-court-decides-the-gps-caseProfessor Colb
united-states-v-jones-and-the-fourth-amendment-evolves-2.
states that she feels "optimistic about the future of the Fourth Amendment"
post-Jones and pointed to the fact that Justices Scalia and Alito both
"endorse[d] the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test," as supporting her
cause for optimism. fd.
192. Certainly, if one accepts the notion that the trespass doctrine has never gone out
of use and has always been available as an arrow in one's Fourth Amendment
quiver, there is nothing "landmark" about the Jones decision.
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Justice Sotomayor touched on this in her concurring opinion in
Jones. She noted:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial
or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to
online retailers. Perhaps, as Justice ALITO notes,
some people may find the "tradeoff' of privacy for
convenience "worthwhile," or come to accept this
"diminution of privacy" as "inevitable," post, at 962,
and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would
accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to
the Government of a list of every Web site they had
visited in the last week, or month, or year. But
whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 193
And Justice Alito succinctly explained the dilemma.
The Katz expectation-of-privacy test ... is not without
its own difficulties. It involves a degree of circularity,
and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of
privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable
person to which the Katz test looks. In addition, the
Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set
of privacy expectations. But technology can change
those expectations. Dramatic technological change

193. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, 1., concurring).
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may lead to periods in which popular expectations are
in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes
in popular attitudes. New technology may provide
increased convenience or security at the expense of
privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff
worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome
the diminution of privacy that new technology entails,
they may eventually reconcile themselves to this
development as inevitable. 194
The question, it seems, is should the inevitability of advancing
technology define society's reasonable expectation of privacy?
Or as Professor Amsterdam so eloquently stated, the question "is
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the
police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints,
the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would
be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free
and open society.,,195 If it is inevitable that technology will
develop x-ray vision glasses that police can wear to see the
contents of a student's backpack as he walks down the street, or
the inside of a woman's purse as she walks in public, does this
mean the student and the woman have no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the backpack or purse because each is aware of the
use of such technology by police? If one's legitimate realm of
privacy is to be dependent upon the type of technology available
to intrude into that realm, without trespassing, "the [Fourth]
[A]mendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the kind
of open society to which we are committed and in which the
[A]mendment is supposed to function. What kind of society is
that?,,196 Because the Court based its holding on the resuscitated
trespass doctrine in Jones, the answer to these questions must
await another day.

194. Id. at 962 (Ali to, 1., concurring).
195. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on The Fourth Amendment, 38 MINN. L.
REv. 349,403 (1974).
196. Id.at402.
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